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ABSTRACT 
This study shows that credit default swap (CDS) reference firms are more likely to conduct 
acquisitions. In economic terms, CDS reference firms have a 5.1% higher acquisition 
propensity than non-CDS firms. Additionally, CDS reference acquirers experience higher 
announcement returns. This is driven by CDS reference acquirers with high credit risk, who 
are also negatively associated with a change in the probability of default. The positive effect 
of CDS on acquisition performance is attributable to the empty creditor threat posed by CDS-
protected creditors. Finally, consistent with CDS increasing debt capacity, cash is more likely 
to be used as the payment method. 
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Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Acquisitions 
Over the last 20 years, a substantial fraction of the largest US listed firms have seen the 
inception of credit default swap (CDS) contracts on their corporate debt. In December 2014, 
outstanding CDS contracts referencing non-financial firms stood at $6 trillion.
1
 Recent 
theoretical and empirical work suggests that CDS may have real effects on corporate finance 
activities of reference firms (see, for instance, Augustin et al. (2014)). For example, Saretto 
and Tookes (2013) find that CDS reference firms (henceforth CDS firms) have higher 
leverage and increased debt maturities; Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) provide 
evidence that CDS firms have higher bankruptcy risk, whilst Subrahmanyam, Tang, and 
Wang (2016) show that CDS firms hold higher cash balances. However, the literature 
remains silent on the effect of CDS on corporate investments. In their extensive review of the 
CDS literature, Augustin et al. (2016) flag this up as an important topic for future research. 
The objective of this study is to fill this gap by empirically examining how CDS impacts 
acquisition investments. In particular, we investigate how CDS affects firms’ propensity to 
carry out acquisitions, the CDS effect on shareholders in acquisition deals, and the impact of 
CDS on the crucial choice of the acquisition payment method.  
A CDS is similar to an insurance contract on firm debt, whereby a debt protection buyer 
pays a periodic premium to a debt protection seller, who in the case of a credit event (such as 
default) will pay the buyer the difference between the nominal and market value of the firm 
debt. The availability of CDS may change creditor behavior in three critical ways. Firstly, by 
enabling creditors to transfer credit risk, CDS reduces creditors’ exposure and their 
regulatory capital requirements, allowing them to extend more credit to reference firms 
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(Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014)), which is referred to as the diversification benefit hypothesis 
(Bolton and Oehmke (2011)).
2
  
Secondly, because creditors transfer risk to CDS sellers, they may be less incentivized to 
monitor CDS firms (Morrison (2005)), resulting in weaker screening, debt terms (Shan, Tang, 
and Winton (2014) and Shan, Tang, and Winton (2015)), and discipline imposed on 
underperformance (Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri (2015)) than in the case of non-CDS 
firms, which is referred to as the weak monitoring hypothesis. For instance, CDS inception 
results in lending that is less secured (Shan, Tang, and Winton (2015)) and with less 
restrictive covenants (Shan, Tang, and Winton (2014)). Accordingly, whilst creditors appear 
generally to restrict borrowers’ investment when debt covenants are violated (Chava and 
Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)), Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri (2015) 
document that this is not the case for CDS firms.  
Thirdly, because CDS partially or fully separates creditors’ control rights from their cash 
flow rights, the relationship between debtors and creditors changes. In particular, CDS 
protected creditors are more strongly positioned (i.e., stronger bargaining power) during any 
subsequent default debt renegotiation (Bolton and Oehmke (2011)). Additionally, if creditors 
are fully CDS insured, they may become so called “empty creditors”, and benefit more from 
the CDS firm (i.e., debtor) going bankrupt than surviving (Hu and Black (2008) and Bolton 
and Oehmke (2011)). The existence of empty creditors, and the corresponding change in their 
incentives to maintain the firm as a going concern (i.e., they prefer firms to go bankrupt), will 
deter CDS firms from strategically defaulting on their debt, enabling them to commit ex ante 
to a lower probability of strategic default (Bolton and Oehmke (2011)). This commitment 
benefit may reduce the cost of debt (Kim (2013)) and increase debt capacity (Bolton and 
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Oehmke (2011) and Campello and Matta (2013)), which is referred to as the empty creditor 
threat hypothesis.  
The above consequences of CDS have important implications for acquisition investment 
levels and acquirer stock returns, which we describe more fully in section I below. 
Accordingly, the increased debt capacity predicted by the diversification benefit hypothesis 
should enable CDS firms to undertake a greater level of acquisition investment than non-CDS 
firms. The weak monitoring hypothesis also predicts more acquisition investments for CDS 
firms relative to non-CDS ones. The empty creditor threat hypothesis predicts either a greater 
level of acquisition investment for CDS relative to non-CDS firms - due to increased debt 
capacity brought about by the commitment benefit - or no effect if CDS firms invest more 
cautiously (Augustin et al. (2014)).  
Acquirer stock returns will be affected as well. In particular, the diversification benefit 
hypothesis predicts lower stock returns for CDS firms relative to non-CDS ones; this is the 
result of managers using the increased debt capacity to fund acquisitions in order to reduce 
their employment risk, associated with the relatively higher bankruptcy risk of CDS firms 
(Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)), allowing debtholders (rather than shareholders) to capture the 
benefits from any new positive NPV acquisitions. The weak monitoring can lead CDS 
acquirer stock returns to be either lower than non-CDS acquirers because it may enable CDS 
acquirers to invest in negative net present value projects that benefit management at 
shareholders’ expense (i.e., the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986)); or, alternatively, 
higher acquirer stock returns if weak monitoring permits risk shifting investments that benefit 
shareholders at debtholders’ expense (Augustin et al. (2014)). Finally, acquirer stock returns 
will be higher for CDS firms compared to non-CDS firms under the empty creditor threat, 
which results in greater effort and caution by CDS acquirers, thus benefiting shareholders 
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without expropriating debtholders (Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and Campello 
and Matta (2013)).  
We focus on acquisition investments for a number of reasons. Firstly, acquisitions are the 
largest and most important corporate investments (Harford and Li (2007)) that a firm can 
undertake. Secondly, since CDS firms - as noted above - may invest in riskier projects, any 
impact of CDS will be more visible in an acquisition setting since acquisitions are relatively 
riskier investments (Harford and Li (2007)) with uncertain net present value. Along these 
lines, acquisitions have been shown to increase default risk (Acharya and Johnson (2007), 
Bessembinder et al. (2009) and Furfine and Rosen (2011)). Thirdly, acquisitions have public 
announcement dates, which are critical to our research design, enabling us to clearly identify 
value impacts via event study analysis and facilitating the identification strategy.  
We use a comprehensive sample of US rated firms over the period between 2001 and 
2013 to test our hypotheses. Our first empirical test provides strong support for the 
hypothesis that the presence of CDS increases acquisition activity. We find that CDS firms 
are significantly more likely to carry out acquisition investments, and display higher 
acquisition intensity. In economic terms, the presence of CDS increases the probability of 
doing an acquisition by a substantial 5.1% over the sample average. We conduct several 
robustness tests to address the issue of causality. Since acquisitions tend to increase default 
risk, acquiring firms are more likely to have CDS initiated on their debt in the post-
acquisition period.
3
 Furthermore, creditors with inside information on future acquisition plans 
may initiate CDS in advance of acquisitions (Acharya and Johnson (2007)) giving rise to 
reverse causality. We employ a difference-in-difference analysis, propensity score matching 
and instrumental variables analysis, all of which confirm our key finding that the availability 
of CDS increases acquisition activity. Our results are consistent with all three hypotheses. 
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Next, we examine the shareholder wealth impact of acquisitions by CDS firms. We find 
that CDS acquirers earn announcement stock returns that are a significantly 0.6% higher than 
non-CDS acquirers. Economically, this translates into a $78.55 million shareholder value 
enhancement for a mean-sized sample acquirer. This finding is inconsistent with the 
diversification benefit hypothesis, which predicts that stock returns should be lower for CDS 
firms than non-CDS firms. It is, however, consistent with either risk shifting due to weak 
monitoring or the empty creditor threat, both of which predict value enhancement for 
shareholders. 
To distinguish between these two explanations, we condition acquirer shareholder and 
debtholder effects on credit risk. Both CDS outcomes - weak monitoring risk shifting and 
empty creditor higher caution/effort - are predicted to occur for firms with high (rather than 
low) credit risk. Studies have shown that risk shifting incentives increase with credit risk 
(Eisdorfer (2008) and Danielova, Sarkar, and Hong (2013)), thus the weak monitoring is 
expected to magnify this effect for CDS firms. Similarly, Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and 
Campello and Matta (2013) argue that the positive impact of the empty creditor threat on 
firms’ exertion of effort and caution will be more pronounced for CDS firms with high credit 
risk, since these firms have a higher probability to default, and thus are most concerned with 
the empty creditor threat. Therefore, the weak monitoring hypothesis predicts that CDS firms 
with high credit risk are likely to undertake investments that benefit shareholders at the 
expense of debtholders, whilst the empty creditor hypothesis predicts that shareholders will 
be better off without debtholders being worse off (i.e., debtholders are also positively affected 
or neutral).  
We find that the higher announcement stock returns to CDS acquirers are driven by those 
with high credit risk. Economically, high credit risk CDS firms increase shareholders’ wealth 
in the range of 1.3% to 2.3%. This finding is consistent with both theories. However, we find 
6 
 
that CDS acquirers with high credit risk also realize a significantly negative impact on the 
probability of default (in the range of -2.3% to -2.8% based on the model). This finding 
suggests that, due to the empty creditor threat, CDS acquirers with high credit risk conduct 
acquisitions that are more cautious and beneficial to both debtholders and shareholders. This 
finding goes against the risk shifting explanation of the weak monitoring hypothesis. We 
further validate that the empty creditor threat is behind the effect of CDS on acquisitions by 
investigating firms that are particularly subject to this threat (i.e., firms with a high proportion 
of “no restructuring” CDS contracts) and finding that CDS benefits both shareholders and 
debtholders.  
Finally, because acquisition investments by CDS firms are more likely to be financed by 
debt,
4
 CDS has important implications for the method of payment used for acquisitions. If the 
presence of CDS increases debt capacity, then CDS acquirers are more likely to use cash and 
less likely to use stock as the means of exchange, compared to non-CDS acquirers. Prior 
literature has shown that cash offers are mostly financed with debt (Harford, Klasa, and 
Walcott (2009)). However, regardless of the source of existing cash, CDS acquirers are more 
likely, all else being equal, to use cash since they have better subsequent access to the credit 
markets. Consistent with these expectations, we find that CDS firms carry out more cash than 
stock acquisitions. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on CDS by increasing our 
understanding of how the presence of CDS impacts investment levels and outcomes, the 
broader literature on credit market frictions and investment, and the literature on M&As. 
Firstly, our study is the first to examine the effect of CDS on real investment activity. Whilst 
empirical studies show that CDS firms raise more external funding, it is unclear how these 
funds are used (Augustin et al. (2014)). More broadly, we contribute to the literature showing 
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that credit market frictions constrain firm investments (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Lemmon 
and Roberts (2010), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida et al. (2012)), and particularly 
acquisition investments which are shown to be affected by the lack of syndicated bank loan 
ratings (Sufi (2009)) and credit ratings (Harford and Uysal (2014)), or according to the level 
of firm rating (Aktas et al. (2016)). This study provides evidence that CDS is an important 
determinant of firms’ propensity to conduct acquisition investments. 
Secondly, this study shows how the presence of CDS influences the value impact of a 
key corporate finance decision. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which 
provides evidence of an increase in acquirer stock returns for firms which are of high credit 
risk and likely to be financially distressed. In particular, we show that this is the case for CDS 
firms due to the empty creditor threat. Our study is therefore the first that reports a 
shareholder value enhancing effect associated with the empty creditor threat. Additionally, 
our findings contribute to the literature examining debtholder effects of M&As (Billett, King, 
and Mauer (2004), Bessembinder et al. (2009), Furfine and Rosen (2011), and Deng, Kang, 
and Low (2013)). This literature emphasizes the role of the private benefits accruing to 
acquirer management in driving risk-increasing acquisitions. Our results suggest that the 
behavior of creditors, and particularly their negotiating strength, may also play an important 
role. 
Thirdly, our study relates to the literature on the choice of method of payment in 
acquisitions and particularly to recent studies which show that higher debt capacity leads to 
higher (lower) use of cash (stock). For example, Harford et al. (2009) and Uysal (2011) use 
distance from target debt ratio, whilst Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos (2014) use credit 
ratings as a measure of debt capacity. We contribute to the understanding of what determines 
the method of payment by showing that the presence of CDS has an independent positive 
(negative) impact on the likelihood of using cash (stock).  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the development of our hypotheses. 
Section II describes the sample selection and data. Section III presents the empirical findings 
for the impact of CDS on the propensity of acquisition investments, acquirer announcement 
returns and change in acquirer probability of default. Section IV discusses the results for the 
effect of CDS on the choice of payment method. Finally, section V concludes the study.  
 
I. Hypotheses Development 
A. CDS and Acquisition Investments 
The diversification benefit hypothesis predicts that CDS, through the relaxation of the 
regulatory capital of the CDS firms’ creditors, allows creditors to extend more debt to CDS 
firms. This should enable CDS firms to fund additional investment projects that would 
otherwise be missed (Danis and Gamba (2015)), implying more acquisitions for CDS firms 
relative to non-CDS ones. 
H1 (Diversification Benefit Hypothesis): CDS firms are related with a greater level of 
acquisition investment relative to non-CDS firms.  
According to the weak monitoring hypothesis, investments that may have been blocked 
by lenders (by withholding finance) of non-CDS firms will be undertaken by CDS firms 
(Augustin et al. (2014)). Therefore, this hypothesis also predicts a higher level of acquisition 
investment for CDS firms compared to non-CDS firms. 
H2 (Weak Monitoring Hypothesis): CDS firms are related with a greater level of 
acquisition investment relative to non-CDS firms.  
According to the empty creditor threat hypothesis, the commitment benefits arising from 
the stronger bargaining power of creditors holding CDS lead to an increase in firms’ debt 
capacity (Bolton and Oehmke (2011)), enabling CDS firms to undertake additional positive 
net present value projects. However, the threat that empty creditors pose if firms default may 
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cause CDS firms to be cautious.
5
 This may result in investment levels not increasing despite 
higher debt capacity (Augustin et al. (2014)). The empty creditor hypothesis therefore 
predicts that CDS have either a positive or no impact on acquisition investments. 
H3 (Empty Creditor Threat Hypothesis): CDS firms are related with a greater or similar 
level of acquisition investment relative to non-CDS firms.   
 
B. CDS and Acquirer Stock Abnormal Returns 
CDS should also have important effects on acquirer stock abnormal returns. As argued 
above, the diversification benefit hypothesis predicts higher acquisition activities for CDS 
firms compared to non-CDS firms. Given that CDS firms are associated with higher 
bankruptcy risk (Subrahmanyam et al. 2014), the benefits of the new projects are captured by 
debtholders whose collateral value increases proportionally to the value of the new project. 
Such decisions, which also benefit managers by decreasing their employment risk (Bagnani 
et al. (1994)), lead to non-positive abnormal returns for shareholders of CDS acquirers, 
implying lower abnormal returns for such firms relative to the corresponding abnormal 
returns of non-CDS acquirers. 
H4 (Diversification Benefit Hypothesis): CDS acquirers are related with lower stock 
abnormal returns relative to non-CDS acquirers.  
According to the weak monitoring hypothesis, the weaker monitoring of CDS firms by 
their creditors relative to non-CDS firms may allow CDS firms to make riskier investments 
leading to risk shifting that benefit shareholders at the expense of debtholders (Augustin et al. 
2014);
6
 this implies higher shareholder abnormal returns for CDS acquirers compared to non-
CDS acquirers. Since prior studies have shown that risk shifting incentives increase with 
                                                          
5
 For example, Subrahmanyam et al. (2016) find that CDS firms hold significantly higher cash balances as a 
precaution against exacting creditors during debt renegotiations.  
6
 In support of this notion, firms are shown to increase operational (as well as financial) risk following the 
inception of CDS (Karolyi (2013)). 
10 
 
credit risk (Eisdorfer (2008) and Danielova, Sarkar, and Hong (2013)), the weak monitoring 
is expected to magnify this effect for CDS firms. This implies a stronger wealth transfer for 
high credit risk acquirers relative to low credit risk acquirers. Alternatively, the weak 
monitoring may enable CDS acquirers to invest in negative net present value projects that 
benefit management at the expense of shareholders (i.e., the free cash flow theory of Jensen 
(1986)). Hence, the risk shifting argument of the weak monitoring hypothesis predicts that 
abnormal returns of CDS acquirers will be higher than non-CDS acquirers, whilst the free 
cash flow argument of the weak monitoring hypothesis predicts the opposite result (i.e., CDS 
acquirers will have lower abnormal returns than non-CDS acquirers). 
H5a (Weak Monitoring Risk Shifting Hypothesis): CDS acquirers are related with higher 
stock abnormal returns relative to non-CDS acquirers.  
H5b (Weak Monitoring Free Cash Flow Hypothesis): CDS acquirers are related with 
lower stock abnormal returns relative to non-CDS acquirers. 
The empty creditor threat may lead CDS acquirers to exert greater effort and caution, 
resulting in acquisitions that benefit shareholders without expropriating debtholders (Bolton 
and Oehmke (2011) and Campello and Matta (2013)).
7
 This positive effect is likely to be 
more pronounced in CDS acquirers with high credit risk, since these firms have a higher 
probability of default, and thus are most concerned with the empty creditor threat (Bolton and 
Oehmke (2011) and Campello and Matta (2013)). Therefore, we expect that CDS acquirers 
subject to the empty creditor threat should experience relatively higher stock returns and this 
effect should be prevalent for firms with high credit risk.   
H6 (Empty Creditor Threat Hypothesis): CDS acquirers are related with higher stock 
abnormal returns relative to non-CDS acquirers. 
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II. Sample and Data 
Our sample consists of all US publicly listed firms covered on COMPUSTAT/CRSP 
over the period 2001 to 2013. The starting date is determined by CDS data coverage on the 
Markit CDS database, a commonly used CDS dealer quote source as used by other recent 
studies (see, for instance, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)). We identify which sample firms have 
CDS, and the inception date, by matching Compustat firms to Markit CDS firms using firm 
CUSIPs from the Markit RED entity files. We exclude firm years for which there is no credit 
rating, since a significant part of our analysis requires the credit rating level.
8
 Following 
previous studies (see, for instance, Harford and Uysal (2014) and Aktas et al. (2016)), we 
also exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Our 
final sample includes 1,727 unique firms (13,302 firm-year observations), comprising 651 
CDS firms (5,201 firm-year observations) and 1,076 non-CDS firms (8,101 firm-year 
observations). 
Acquisition data for sample firms are obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database for 2002 through 2014. We define acquisitions to include all 
completed mergers, acquisitions of target firms that are either public, private, or subsidiaries, 
majority interest acquisitions, asset acquisitions or acquisitions of certain assets made by 
public acquirers. To ensure that transactions represent a transfer of control, we require that 
the acquirer owns less than 50% of target shares prior to the acquisition announcement and 
seeks to acquire more than 90% after the deal. We also require that transactions are 
economically meaningful for acquirers, and thus the deal value is above $1 million and the 
relative size (transaction value divided by acquirer market value four weeks prior to 
acquisition announcement) is at least 1%. This screening process identifies 2,730 acquisitions 
(1,103 of which are by 575 CDS-traded unique acquirers) conducted by 858 unique acquirers. 
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Table I provides a year-on-year breakdown of sample firms, number and proportion of 
CDS and non-CDS firms, and acquisition activity. The number and proportion of CDS firms 
(columns (4) and (5)) exhibit an increasing trend in the early years of the millennium, 
reaching a peak - with almost half the sample firms having CDS - in 2007 and 2008, around 
the emergence of the credit crisis. Since 2008, the proportion of CDS firms has decreased, 
from 45.64% to 35.08% in 2013. This pattern is consistent with prior literature (see, for 
example, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)). Acquisition activity (column (3)) is shown to drop 
substantially in 2008 and 2009, before subsequently reverting to near pre-crisis levels. The 
time series pattern of acquisitions by CDS (column (6)) and non-CDS firms (column (9)) 
reflects both this break in 2008-2009 and a close correlation with the number of CDS and 
non-CDS firms.  
[Please Insert Table I About Here] 
We report summary statistics on dependent and control variables for the overall sample, 
as well as CDS and non-CDS firms in Table II. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. What is worth mentioning is that there are significant mean and median 
differences in the characteristics between CDS- and non-CDS firms. CDS firms have higher 
credit ratings, higher interest coverage, are larger, more profitable, hold more cash (in median 
terms only), have a lower probability of default, realize lower excess stock returns, have 
higher growth opportunities, lower leverage, lower volatility (in stock returns and 
profitability), and appear in more concentrated and less M&A intensive industries than non-
CDS firms. Acquisitions involving CDS firms are also more likely to be public, hostile, cross 
border, diversifying, completed by tender offer and to involve relatively large targets. 
Additionally, CDS firms exhibit higher acquisition likelihood (but lower intensity), and 
realize lower acquirer announcement returns (median only). 
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These univariate comparisons, however, could be misleading, as they do not consider 
any confounding effects. For instance, CDS firms are substantially larger than non-CDS 
firms. Prior literature has shown that larger firms are associated with lower acquisition 
returns (see, for instance, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)) and a higher likelihood 
of making an acquisition (Harford (1999)). Therefore, firm and deal-specific characteristics 
need to be controlled for in order to reveal the net effect of CDS on the variables of interest. 
We now proceed to do so in the multivariate regression analyses presented in the next 
section. 
[Please Insert Table II About Here] 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
A. CDS and Acquisition Investments 
We examine the causal relation between the presence of CDS and acquisition 
investments by controlling for various firm- and industry-specific characteristics, which prior 
literature has shown to affect acquisition investments. Table III reports the results for this 
analysis. To mitigate endogeneity concerns all independent variables are lagged by one year. 
All regressions also control for year and industry fixed effects since acquisition activity 
varies across industry and time (see, for example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford 
(2005)). Moreover, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
firm level due to the presence of repeated firms in the sample. To ease the interpretation, we 
report marginal effects instead of regression coefficients. These can be interpreted as the 
average change in the dependent variable across all observations for CDS firms relative to 
non-CDS firms.  
In specification (1) we run a pooled probit regression where the dependent variable takes 
the value of one if the firm makes at least one acquisition in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
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Our main variable of interest is CDS, which is an indicator that takes the value of one for 
CDS firms, and zero otherwise. Specification (1) also includes credit rating level, as in Aktas 
et al. (2016), and other control variables; size, excess stock return, leverage, profitability, 
cash holdings, market-to-book, Herfindahl index, and M&A liquidity. Except for credit rating 
level, Harford and Uysal (2014) employ similar controls. We find that the coefficient on CDS 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In economic terms, having CDS 
increases a firm’s probability of conducting an acquisition by a significant 5.1%. This key 
finding that CDS firms make more acquisitions is consistent with the diversification benefit, 
weak monitoring and empty creditor threat hypotheses.  
The results of the control variables are also interesting. Consistent with prior work, firms 
are more acquisitive when they have a high credit rating level (specification (1) only), less 
debt, strong performance, and high industry M&A volume. The effect of size on acquisition 
likelihood is negative, consistent with Aktas et al. (2016) who also use a sample of rated 
firms, but opposite to that of Harford and Uysal (2014). Thus, the effect of size differs for 
rated firms.
9
  
In specification (2), we use acquisition intensity as the dependent variable in a tobit 
specification censored at zero (see also Harford and Uysal (2014), and Aktas et al. (2016) for 
a similar approach) and report the unconditional marginal effects.
10
 The dependent variable is 
the sum of acquisition deal values in a given year scaled by firm total assets at the beginning 
of the year. This specification allows us to investigate whether the higher likelihood of 
making an acquisition also translates into acquisition expenditure. This is indeed the case; the 
coefficient for CDS is still positive and significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic 
                                                          
9
 We also perform a variance inflation factor test for multicollinearity and find that the correlation between the 
explanatory variables does not materially affect our estimates.   
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 It is not possible to interpret the regression coefficients of a tobit model in the same way as OLS coefficients. 
The former captures the marginal effect on the latent variable. To interpret the economic significance, we need 
to multiply the coefficient with the probability that an observation becomes uncensored (which means that it 
becomes positive in our models) (see McDonald and Moffitt (1980)). This is the effect we report in the table.   
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significance, acquisition intensity increases by 1% for CDS firms, which is considerable 
given the mean sample acquisition intensity of 2.8%. The signs on control variables exhibit 
the same relation as specification (1) apart from credit rating level which is now statistically 
insignificant. Overall, the positive association between CDS and acquisition investment 
supports all three hypotheses (i.e., diversification benefit, weak monitoring and empty 
creditor threat).  
[Please Insert Table III About Here] 
 
B. CDS and Acquisition Investments: Endogeneity 
The above analysis is based on the assumption that the presence of CDS is exogenously 
determined. However, Table II showed that there are significant differences between CDS- 
and non-CDS firms, suggesting that the presence of CDS could be determined endogenously. 
Unobserved omitted variables may drive both the presence of CDS and the decision to carry 
out acquisitions. Moreover, CDS is more likely to be initiated when firms make acquisitions, 
as acquisitions are related with increases in leverage and associated default risk (see, for 
example, Billett et al. (2004), Bessembinder et al. (2009), and Furfine and Rosen (2011)). 
Furthermore, creditors with inside information on future acquisition plans may initiate CDS 
in advance of acquisitions (Acharya and Johnson (2007)). In this case, self-selection bias (i.e., 
reverse causality) emerges, producing unreliable estimates (Heckman (1979)). We address 
these concerns by performing three additional analyses: i) difference in difference (DID); ii) 
propensity score matching (PSM); and iii) instrumental variables (IV). 
 
B.I. Difference in Difference (DID) Approach 
Factors which affect the initiation of CDS could also influence the decision of a firm to 
conduct an acquisition. To deal with this issue, we follow Harford and Uysal (2014) and 
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examine whether a change in CDS status affects acquisition likelihood. In particular, we 
restrict our sample to firms without CDS two years prior to an acquisition (i.e., in t-2) and 
investigate whether the initiation of CDS in the subsequent year (i.e., in t-1) meaningfully 
affects acquisition decisions in year t relative to firms without CDS at t-2 and t-1. Panel A of 
Table IV presents the results. Both probit and tobit regressions show significant association 
between CDS and acquisition investments, with the coefficients carrying a positive sign and 
almost double in magnitude to those in the main analysis (i.e., Table III), while keeping their 
statistical significance at the 1% level. More specifically, CDS increases the likelihood of 
carrying out an acquisition by 8.10% and acquisition intensity by 1.80%. Therefore, our main 
results hold after performing DID analysis. 
 
B.II. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach 
As a further test to ensure that it is not simply the characteristics of CDS firms that drive 
both the presence of CDS and their probability to conduct acquisitions, we implement the 
propensity score matching (PSM) method. To highlight the simplicity of the PSM as a 
technique for addressing endogeneity, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) state: “the key advantage 
of the matching method is that it avoids specification of the functional form: matching 
methods do not rely on a clear source of exogenous variation for identification”.  
As in Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), we match CDS firms (treated) with non-CDS firms 
(control) exhibiting similar characteristics. The treatment effect from the PSM estimation is 
the difference between the CDS firms and the matched non-CDS firms, as measured by the 
CDS coefficient. In order to match firms, we calculate a one-dimensional propensity score, 
which is a function of firm- and industry-specific observable characteristics used in Table III, 
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and we use a one-to-one (i.e., nearest neighbor) matching estimator.
11
 Panel B of Table IV 
presents the results. The treatment effect of CDS is significantly positive at the 1% level in 
both probit and tobit regressions (specifications (1) and (2) respectively), corroborating the 
view that CDS increases the likelihood and intensity of acquisitions. 
 
B.III. Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
As a final test to alleviate concerns that the relation between the presence of CDS and 
acquisition investments suffers from endogeneity bias, we implement a two-stage 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. In order to apply the IV approach, the use of 
instrument(s) is critical; that is variable(s) which are determinants of whether the firm has 
CDS, but not related with our dependent variables (i.e., acquisition likelihood and acquisition 
intensity). Our chosen instruments, constructed with data from Compustat Bank files are: i) 
Tier 1 capital: this is the average Tier 1 capital ratio in the banking industry. The likelihood 
of CDS decreases for tier 1 capital ratio firms (Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)); ii) Foreign 
operations: this is the average ratio of foreign loans and deposits by total assets in the 
banking industry. The rationale for this instrument is that there is a positive relation between 
banks’ foreign operations and their FX hedging (Saretto and Tookes (2013) and 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)); iii) Derivatives income: this is the mean absolute gains/losses 
per share from derivatives’ instruments in the banking industry. This instrumental variable is 
motivated by the positive association between the absolute gain/loss per share and the volume 
of derivatives used by banks (Minton et al. (2009)); and iv) TRACE coverage: the likelihood 
of CDS increases after the implementation of TRACE (Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)). These 
instruments are expected to determine the presence of CDS but not be associated with 
acquisition investments. 
                                                          
11
 For robustness, we also use 5-nearest-neighbors, 10-nearest-neighbors, 15-nearest-neighbors, 30-nearest-
neighbors and Gaussian kernel-based matching estimators and find similar results.  
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Table IV, Panel C, presents the results of this analysis. Specification (1) reports the 
probit estimates of the IV first-stage, which includes all four instruments along with the 
control variables used in Table III (apart from our main variable of interest). All four 
instruments carry the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level, providing 
credibility that they are strongly related to the presence of CDS. Additionally, the results 
from the first-stage (F-statistic = 65) reject the null hypothesis of the instruments’ weakness 
(Staiger and Stock (1997)). 
In specification (2), which presents the marginal effects of the probit regression, our 
main variable of interest is the residual CDS. In the spirit of Faulkender and Petersen (2012) 
and Harford and Uysal (2014), we distinguish between firms that qualify for CDS but are not 
CDS firms, and CDS firms which therefore have better access to public debt markets. The 
coefficient on predicted CDS captures the effect of qualifying for CDS on acquisition 
likelihood, and the coefficient on the residual CDS captures the effect of having CDS on 
acquisition likelihood. We estimate the predicted probability of CDS from specification (1), 
where we implemented a probit analysis, while the residual probability of CDS is CDS 
dummy minus the predicted probability. Our main variable of interest, residual CDS, is 
positively and significantly associated with acquisition likelihood at the 1% level. 
Additionally, those firms who qualify to have CDS, but have not, and thus have relatively 
less easy credit market access, have a lower probability to make acquisitions as indicated by 
the negative and significant sign on the predicted CDS coefficient. In specification (3) we 
instead use a tobit model and report unconditional marginal effects. We find similar results to 
specification (2), as the residual CDS (predicted CDS) is again positive (negative) and 
significant at the 1% (5%) level, corroborating the positive impact of CDS on acquisition 
investments.  
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In sum, the empirical analysis in this section provides robust evidence of a positive 
causal effect of CDS on the decision to conduct acquisition investments even after controlling 
for potential endogeneity bias. This finding is consistent with the diversification benefit 
allowing firms to invest more, as well as the predictions of the weak monitoring and the 
empty creditor threat.  
[Please Insert Table IV About Here] 
 
C. CDS and Acquirer Abnormal Returns  
In this section we examine the relation between CDS and acquirer announcement 
abnormal returns. The diversification benefit theory predicts lower abnormal returns for CDS 
acquirers than non-CDS acquirers; the weak monitoring hypothesis predicts either higher 
abnormal returns (in the presence of risk-shifting) or lower abnormal returns (exploitation of 
free-cash flow) for CDS acquirers relative to non-CDS ones; and the empty creditor threat 
predicts higher abnormal returns (determined by high credit risk firms) for CDS acquirers 
compared to non-CDS acquiring firms. 
We estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five-day period (-2, +2) where 
0 is the announcement as in Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012). The returns are 
calculated using the market model with the parameters estimated over the 240 to 41 day 
period prior to the acquisition announcement. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the 
market return.
12
 Average returns for the entire sample are displayed in Table II. Consistent 
with the literature (see, for example, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) and Aktas et 
al. (2016)), the average (median) CAR is a significantly positive 0.79% (0.52%).  
Table V presents the results of the OLS analysis. Following the extant literature, we 
include a set of firm- and deal-specific characteristics as control variables together with year 
                                                          
12
 We also use alternative estimation methodologies (i.e., market-adjusted and equally weighted index returns) 
and none of these variations materially change our results. 
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and industry dummies. Particularly, we include all variables used in the previous analysis as 
well as deal-specific variables which prior literature has shown to affect acquirer 
announcement returns; public deals, hostile deals, tender offer, stock deals, cross border, 
diversifying deals and relative size. Again, the t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and acquiring firm clustering. Model (1) controls only for firm-specific 
characteristics, and shows that CDS is positively associated with acquirer announcement 
abnormal returns. All else equal, CDS increases acquirer returns by 0.7% and this impact is 
statistically significant at the 4.8% level. Including in model (2) deal-specific characteristics 
does not alter our results as we find a similar economic effect (0.6%) of CDS on acquirer 
abnormal returns that is also statistically significant at the 5.1% level. Economically, we 
estimate that having CDS translates into a $78.55 million shareholder value enhancement for 
a mean-sized sample acquirer (mean equity market value = $13,092 million). The signs on 
the control variables are, generally, in line with existing M&A literature. 
[Please Insert Table V About Here] 
It is worth nothing that the incremental acquirer gain of 0.6% is large relative to the 
potential welfare losses associated with CDS suggested by previous studies. For example, 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) estimate that the marginal effect of CDS on the likelihood of 
bankruptcy estimated at the sample means is 0.33%. As Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) point 
out, these greater bankruptcy costs may be outweighed by the CDS benefit of higher firm 
leverage and lower cost of capital. We show that the incremental gains in shareholder wealth 
from acquisition investment are alone sufficient to outweigh the higher bankruptcy cost.
13
 In 
economic terms, for a mean-sized CDS acquirer, the higher expected loss due to default of 
$39.28 million (0.33%*$13,092 million) is outweighed by the incremental acquisition gain of 
$78.55 million (0.60%*$13,092 million) by $39.27 million. 
                                                          
13
 Since we do not include the target firm gains here, we are likely to underestimate the overall gains from a 
social welfare perspective. 
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D. CDS and Acquirer Abnormal Returns/Change in Default Probability by Credit Risk  
Our key finding of higher CARs for CDS firms relative to non-CDS firms is inconsistent 
with the diversification benefit hypothesis, which predicts lower CARs of the former group of 
firms relative to the latter one. It is, however, consistent with both the risk-shifting effect of 
the weak monitoring hypothesis and the empty creditor threat, which leads firms to be more 
cautious and exert greater effort when conducting investments. To distinguish between these 
two explanations, we condition both announcement returns and the change in probability of 
default on credit risk. While the risk-shifting argument of the weak monitoring hypothesis 
predicts that CDS firms with high credit risk are likely to undertake investments that benefit 
shareholders at the expense of debtholders, the empty creditor hypothesis predicts 
shareholders should be better off without expropriating debtholders. 
To test this notion, we repeat the Table V analysis but also interact CDS with three 
measures of credit risk: low interest coverage in model (1), speculative in model (2), and low 
Altman-Z in model (3). The first measure is motivated by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the 
second by Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Kisgen and Strahan (2010) and Karampatsas, 
Petmezas, and Travlos (2014), and the third by Altman (1968) and Molina (2005). Low 
interest coverage is an indicator variable equal to one for firms belonging to the lowest 
interest coverage quartile of sample firms, and zero otherwise. Speculative is an indicator 
variable equal to one for speculative-grade firms (those rated with BB+ or below), and zero 
otherwise. Finally, low Altman-Z is an indicator variable equal to one for firms belonging to 
the lowest Altman-Z quartile of sample firms, and zero otherwise.  
Table VI, Panel A, presents the results. Whereas the effect of CDS itself is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels (implying that on average CDS acquiring firms do not 
make better quality deals), we find that in all three models the interaction variables of CDS * 
low interest coverage, CDS * speculative, and CDS * low Altman-Z are positively associated 
22 
 
with acquirer CARs at conventional significance levels. This indicates that the effect of CDS 
on acquirer returns increases with credit risk. The effect is also economically significant. All 
else equal, CDS conditioned on credit risk increases acquirer CARs by 2.3%, 1.4%, 1.3%, in 
the first, second, and third model, respectively. 
Our results provide evidence of a positive association between CDS and acquirer CARs 
conditioned on firm credit risk. While CDS has been shown to increase credit risk 
(Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)), our finding of higher abnormal returns is driven by CDS 
acquiring firms with relatively higher credit risk. For such firms, the empty creditor threat 
may have the most meaningful impact, causing them to be particularly cautious or to exert 
considerable effort resulting in better quality investments. However, a plausible 
counterargument implied by the weak monitoring hypothesis, could be that firms with high 
credit risk have almost nothing to lose by undertaking risky investment projects, since the 
marginal benefit of a potential value-increasing investment is higher than the marginal cost of 
financial distress. Thus, our results are consistent with the predictions of both the empty 
creditor threat and weak monitoring risk-shifting.  
We assess whether acquisitions by CDS firms are motivated by the empty creditor threat 
or weak monitoring risk-shifting by employing the probability of default using Merton’s 
(1974) model (see Appendix for detailed description).
14
 Specifically, we run an OLS model 
where the dependent variable is the change in the probability of default over the period t-1 to 
t+1 where year t is the year of acquisition. Our specifications control for year and industry 
fixed effects, as well as changes in firm characteristics that can affect the change in default 
probability between the pre- and post-acquisition period, such as changes in firm size, 
profitability, cash holdings, interest coverage, leverage, market-to-book, excess return, 
standard deviation of returns, volatility of profitability, convertible debt, capex, and property, 
                                                          
14
 Hillegeist et al. (2004), Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) and Furfine and Rosen (2011) also use Merton’s 
(1974) model to calculate firm default risk.  
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plant and equipment. We report marginal effects to ease interpretation of the results. If CDS 
acquiring firms are cautious and exert greater effort in the acquisition investments they make 
(i.e., empty creditor threat prediction), we should observe either a decrease or no effect on 
default risk, whilst if they instead conduct risk shifting acquisitions (i.e., weak monitoring 
prediction) we should observe an increase in default risk. 
In Panel B of Table VI we run three models in which we interact CDS with the three 
credit risk measures (i.e., low interest coverage, speculative, and low Altman-Z).
15
 For 
acquiring firms with high credit risk there is a significantly negative association between 
CDS and change in default probability for two of the three interaction variables by a range of 
-2.3% to -2.9% (the second model reports a neutral association). This finding implies that 
these acquirers are particularly cautious and exert greater effort in the acquisitions they 
conduct, consistent with the empty creditor threat but inconsistent with the risk-shifting 
argument of the weak monitoring hypothesis, which predicts an increase in probability of 
default. Our results are particularly striking given that acquisitions are generally shown to 
increase default risk (Billett et al. (2004), Bessembinder et al. (2009) and Furfine and Rosen 
(2011)). 
[Please Insert Table VI About Here] 
We also perform the following unreported robustness tests of CDS on acquiring firm 
debtholders: i) we employ as an alternative dependent variable the credit rating upgrade, 
which is a dummy variable set equal to one if the acquiring firm’s credit rating level is 
upgraded over the period t-1 to t+1, where year t is the year of acquisition, and zero 
otherwise. For all three credit risk measures, the interaction variables with CDS are positive 
and significant at the 5% level; and ii) we examine the effect of CDS on acquirer abnormal 
bondholder returns. We measure abnormal bondholder value-weighted returns as in 
                                                          
15
 When examining the individual effect of acquiring firms with CDS (i.e., not interacted with credit risk 
variables) on credit risk, we find a positive association, consistent with the finding of Subrahmanyam et al. 
(2014) (i.e., an increase in credit risk for firms with CDS protection). 
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Bessembinder et al. (2009), using pricing data from the TRACE database, and employing the 
event window (-2, +2) surrounding the acquisition announcement. We do not uncover any 
significant association of bondholder returns with the three CDS-credit risk interaction 
variables, and thus our results reject the weak monitoring hypothesis but are consistent with 
the empty creditor threat argument.
 
 
Collectively, the results of this analysis indicate that CDS acquiring firms with high 
credit risk conduct better quality deals without increasing their probability of default. This 
pattern indicates that the threat of bankruptcy/liquidation posed by empty creditors is the 
underlying mechanism in the relation between CDS and acquisition outcomes. To provide 
further inferences on this notion we now proceed to examine the announcement returns and 
probability of default for CDS acquiring firms, which are particularly subject to the empty 
creditor problem.  
 
E. Is the Empty Creditor Threat the Mechanism for the Impact of CDS on Acquisitions?  
We follow Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and examine the impact of “no restructuring” 
clauses in CDS contracts. In these cases, a bankruptcy, and not debt restructuring, defines the 
credit event generating payments to CDS buyers. In these cases the threat of empty creditors 
forcing CDS firms into bankruptcy is higher since empty creditors are less incentivized to 
encourage borrower bankruptcy if restructuring qualifies as a credit event.
16
 Therefore, if the 
CDS contract contains a “no restructuring” clause, acquiring firms are likely to exercise more 
caution and/or effort. This should lead to a positive (non-positive) association with acquirer 
CARs (probability of default), and be driven by firms with high credit risk. This is exactly 
what we find. 
                                                          
16
 In such cases, empty creditors may still be better off with a bankruptcy outcome as their total payoff is larger 
than through debt restructuring. 
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For each CDS firm, there can be multiple CDS contracts, and for each contract there are 
four possible clauses associated with different credit event definitions: i) “no restructuring” 
clause; ii) full restructuring; iii) modified restructuring; and iv) modified-modified 
restructuring.
17
 The variable, “no restructuring” CDS, represents the fraction of CDS 
contracts with “no restructuring” clauses for a given reference entity. High “no 
restructuring” CDS is an indicator variable that equals to one for firms belonging to the 
highest no restructuring CDS quartile of sample firms (i.e., those with the highest fraction of 
“no restructuring” CDS), and zero otherwise.18 To test whether the empty creditor threat lies 
behind our CAR and default probability results, we interact the high “no restructuring” CDS 
variable with the credit risk variables used above (i.e., low interest coverage, speculative, and 
low Altman-Z).  
Table VII presents the results of this analysis. Panel A reports the CAR results, showing 
that the interaction variables of the high “no restructuring” clause and high credit risk 
variables are positively associated with acquirer CARs at conventional significance levels in 
two out of the three models (specifications (1) and (2)). Panel B reports the results for the 
probability of default. In this case, the interaction variables are negatively and significantly 
(at the 5% level) associated with the change in default probability in all three models. 
Overall, these results provide further support that the empty creditor threat is the underlying 
mechanism behind the relationship between CDS-traded debt and acquisition outcomes. 
[Please Insert Table VII About Here] 
 
IV. CDS and the Method of Payment in M&As 
To offer a more complete picture of the effect of CDS in acquisitions, we examine 
whether CDS influences the choice of payment method. Karampatsas et al. (2014) provide 
                                                          
17
 See Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) for further discussion of these four credit events. 
18
 We find that 67% (436 out of 651) of CDS firms have at least one CDS contract with a “no restructuring” 
clause. For these firms, the average proportion of CDS contracts with a “no restructuring” clause is 31%. 
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evidence that a high credit rating level relaxes financial constraints, allowing easier access to 
credit markets. In particular, acquiring firms with a higher rating have better opportunities to 
borrow due to lower cost and higher demand for their debt securities, which leads to a 
relatively higher propensity to use cash as the method of payment. In a similar vein, if CDS 
reduces financial constraints for CDS firms, they will be less reluctant to spend cash as it will 
be relatively easier for them to borrow in the future.
19
 We therefore predict a positive 
association between CDS acquiring firms and cash method of payment. 
Table VIII contains the results from our analysis, which is comparable, having the same 
control variables, to that in Table III. In model (1) we report the marginal effects of a probit 
specification where the dependent variable equals to one if the firm makes at least one 100% 
cash-financed acquisition,
20
 and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient for CDS is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. In economic terms, having CDS increases the likelihood of a 
cash-financed acquisition by 3.4% over the sample average. In model (2) we conduct the 
same analysis but the dependent variable equals to one for at least one 100% stock-financed 
acquisition, and zero otherwise.
21
 We find a positive association between CDS and stock 
acquisitions, but it is substantially lower in both economic (CDS increases the likelihood of a 
stock acquisition by just 0.7%) and statistical significance (at the 10% level). Additionally, 
the difference between CDS and the likelihood of cash versus stock acquisitions is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with our prediction that CDS should lead to 
more cash deals. Finally, in model (3) we perform an ordered probit in which the dependent 
variable equals to zero for no acquisitions, one for stock-financed deals, and two for cash-
                                                          
19
 The source of accumulated cash is beyond the scope of this paper. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight 
that, irrespective of the source of cash, CDS acquiring firms might be more inclined to use cash due to their ease 
of access to the credit markets in the future.   
20
 We obtain similar results if all transactions that are more than 50% cash financed are included in the analysis.  
21
 Note that the number of observations in the probit models estimated for cash-financed acquisitions 
(specification (1)) and stock-financed acquisitions (specification (2)) differ quite substantially. This is due to the 
fact that a number of observations perfectly predict the success or failure in the dependent variable and these 
observations are dropped from the estimation.    
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financed deals. We obtain a positive and significant coefficient for CDS, again suggesting 
that CDS is positively associated with the use of cash. Overall, the results in this section 
suggest that the presence of CDS is an economically and statistically important determinant 
of the choice of payment method in M&As. 
[Please Insert Table VIII About Here] 
 
V. Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate 
acquisitions. We provide evidence that CDS reference firms are more likely to conduct 
acquisition investments by 5.1% relative to non-CDS firms. This result holds after we 
address endogeneity concerns using difference in difference, propensity score matching, 
and instrumental variable techniques. Additionally, we show that CDS acquiring firms 
experience higher announcement stock returns compared to non-CDS acquiring firms. 
Further, apart from the effect of CDS on shareholders, we also investigate the CDS impact 
on debtholders. In particular, we condition the effects of CDS on shareholders and 
debtholders on credit risk and document that stock returns are positively associated, and 
the change in the probability of default around acquisitions is negatively associated, with 
high credit risk CDS firms. Collectively, these positive acquisition outcomes on both 
shareholders and debtholders are consistent with the predictions of the empty creditor 
threat hypothesis, implying that CDS acquiring firms are forced to be more cautious 
and/or exert greater effort in their investments. Finally, we find that CDS firms are more 
likely to use cash as the method of payment, which supports the notion that CDS increases 
debt capacity. 
Our evidence that CDS has real effects on investment activity, value creation, and 
payment method adds to a growing literature that demonstrates CDS contracts are not 
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redundant securities and instead have a real impact on corporate finance outcomes. 
Additionally, our findings have important implications for the policy debate on the broader 
welfare effects of the CDS market.  
Firstly, the increase in leverage associated with CDS may not result in welfare 
benefits if it leads to inefficiently high precautionary cash holding (Subrahmanyam et al. 
(2016)) rather than an increase in investment. We show that this is not actually the case 
and that CDS firms do indeed make more acquisition investments. Secondly, if 
shareholders or debtholders are worse off due to weak monitoring, again welfare may not 
increase. However, by showing that both shareholders and debtholders are better off with 
CDS-induced acquisitions, our findings go against this notion. Our evidence suggests that 
CDS increases economic efficiency (i.e., additional capital to invest and positive outcomes 
for both shareholders and debtholders), thus demonstrating their economic value. Whilst 
the presence of empty creditors may have negative ex post effects in default states, the 
threat of such creditors (and thus their ex ante effects) apparently generates substantial 
value and hence is evidence that CDS is welfare enhancing. The wealth gains that we 
report for CDS acquisitions outweigh the greater expected bankruptcy costs associated 
with CDS. Thus, despite recent criticism against CDS and empty creditors, our results do 
not justify policy restrictions on CDS. Moreover, our finding on the effect of CDS on the 
choice of payment method has important implications, since the use of cash is associated 
with positive shareholder wealth effects and the deterrence of rival bids. Managers and 
financial advisors should therefore take this information into account when engaging in 
M&A deals. 
Finally, our findings raise several pertinent questions. For instance, whilst there is no 
obvious a priori why the CDS effects would not extend to other types of investment, such 
as capital expenditures and R&D, further analysis on other investments would substantiate 
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a more general applicability of our findings. We hope future research will shed light on 
this and other questions associated to the impact of the CDS market on corporate finance 
related issues.  
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Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
 
Acquisition Likelihood: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least 
one acquisition in year t, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson 
Financial SDC. 
  
Acquisition Intensity: The sum of the deal values of all completed acquisitions announced in 
year t scaled by the firm’s total assets in year t-1. Deal values are from Thomson Financial 
SDC, total assets are from COMPUSTAT. Only transactions larger than 1% of market equity 
are included in the sample. 
 
Acquirer CARs: Cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm over the 5-day event 
window (-2, +2) around the announcement day. The returns are calculated using the market 
model with the market model parameters estimated over the period between 240 and 41 days 
prior to the announcement. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return. 
 
Probability of Default: Based on Merton’s (1974) pricing model we calculate the distance to 
default (DD) as the difference between the asset value of the firm (V) and the face value of its 
debt (F), divided by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value (σV). We use an iterative 
procedure by solving a system of two nonlinear equations to estimate asset value and 
volatility. In this system, equity (E) is priced as a European call option on the value of the 
firm’s assets with time to maturity (T) equal to one year. Following Vassalou and Xing 
(2004), F corresponds to debt in current liabilities plus one-half of long-term debt since this 
approach takes into account the fact that long-term debt might not be due until after the 
horizon of the DD estimation. As initial values for asset value and asset volatility, we use V = 
E + F and σV = σE *(E/E+F) where E is the market value of equity at the end of each calendar 
year and σE is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns from the prior year.  
Distance to default is computed as: 
    
                     
 
   
 
  
 
 
where Rbill is the three-month Treasury bill rate, and 0.049 is an empirical proxy for the equity 
premium following Welch and Goyal (2008). As shown in McDonald (2002) and Hillegeist 
et al. (2004) the probability of default is then computed as: 
 
Probability of Default =    
   
 
 
               
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
where N is the standard normal cumulative distribution.  
 
 
Firm Control Variables 
 
CDS: Binary variable for CDS reference firms from Markit that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has CDS, 0 otherwise. 
 
Credit Rating Level: Continuous variable for rated firms from COMPUSTAT which takes the 
value from 1 (D rating) to 22 (AAA rating). The ratings are the Standard and Poor’s ratings. 
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Size: Firm total assets at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT in US$ millions deflated 
using the CPI index with the base year 2001. The regressions use the natural log of this 
variable. 
 
Excess Stock Return: Market adjusted return (using the value-weighted CRSP index as 
benchmark). 
 
Leverage: Total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by total 
assets. 
 
Profitability: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
divided by total assets. 
 
Cash Holdings: Cash holdings divided by total assets. 
 
Market-to-Book: Market value of the firm (Total assets − book value of equity + market value 
of equity) divided by total assets.  
 
StDevRet: The annualized standard deviation of daily returns for a given year.   
 
Volatility: The volatility of profitability, computed using the current and prior four years of 
data. At least two years of data are required in its computation.  
 
Convertible: Convertible debt divided by total assets. 
 
Capex: Capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
 
PPE: Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
 
Interest Coverage: EBITDA over interest expenses. In the regressions we use low interest 
coverage, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms belonging to the lowest interest 
coverage quartile of sample firms, 0 otherwise. 
 
Speculative: Binary variable for rated firms from COMPUSTAT that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm is rated with BB+ or below, 0 otherwise. 
 
Altman-Z: 1.2*(working capital/total assets) + 1.4*(retained earnings/total assets) + 
3.3*(EBIT/total assets) + 0.6*(market value of equity/total liabilities) + (sales/total assets). In 
the regressions we use low Altman-Z, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms 
belonging to the lowest Altman-Z quartile of sample firms, 0 otherwise. 
 
“No Restructuring” CDS: The fraction of CDS contracts with “no restructuring” clauses 
(classified as ‘XR’ on Markit) among all CDS contracts on a given reference entity. In the 
regressions we use high “no restructuring” CDS, which is an indicator variable that equals to 
1 for firms belonging to the highest “no restructuring” CDS quartile of sample firms (i.e., 
those with the highest fraction of “no restructuring” CDS), 0 otherwise. 
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Deal Control Variables 
 
Public: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm is a public firm, 0 
otherwise.  
 
Hostile: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as hostile or unsolicited by 
SDC, 0 otherwise. 
 
Tender Offer: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for tender offers, 0 otherwise.  
 
Stock: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the method of payment is 
100% stock, 0 otherwise.  
 
Cross Border: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of non-US target 
firms, 0 otherwise. 
 
Diversifying: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm operates in a different 
3-digit SIC code industry relative to the acquirer, 0 otherwise.  
 
Relative Size: Ratio of the deal value to the market capitalization of the acquiring firm four 
weeks prior to the acquisition announcement.  
 
 
Industry Control Variables 
 
M&A Liquidity: Sum of acquisitions made in a given year and three-digit SIC code industry, 
divided by the sum of total assets of all COMPUSTAT firms with the same three-digit SIC 
code. 
 
Herfindahl Index: Sum of squares of the market shares of all firms in a given year and three-
digit SIC industry, where market share is defined as sales of the firm divided by the sum of 
the sales in the industry. 
 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
Tier 1 Capital: Banking industry average Tier 1 capital ratio. 
 
Foreign Operations: Banking industry average ratio of foreign loans and deposits divided by 
total assets. 
 
Derivatives Income: Banking industry average absolute gains/losses per share from 
derivatives’ income. 
 
TRACE Coverage: Binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the year of the data is 2003 
or after, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table I 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) Firms versus Non-Credit Default Swap (non-CDS) Firms and Acquisition Activity by Year 
 
This table presents the annual number and proportion of CDS and non-CDS firms and their acquisition activity for the universe of US rated publicly listed firms over the 
period 2001-2013. Column (2) displays the number of unique firms in the sample. Columns (3), (6), and (9) show the number of acquisition deals by all sample firms, CDS 
firms and non-CDS firms, respectively. Columns (4) and (7) present the number of CDS firms, and non-CDS firms, respectively. Columns (5) and (8) report the percentage 
of CDS firms and non-CDS firms, respectively. # denotes number and % denotes percentage. 
 
Year 
 
# Firms 
 
# Acquisitions 
 
# CDS Firms 
 
% CDS Firms 
 
# Acquisitions by 
CDS Firms 
# Non-CDS 
Firms 
% Non-CDS 
Firms 
# Acquisitions by 
Non-CDS Firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
2001 1,039 - 217 20.89% - 822 79.11% - 
2002 1,045 219 300 28.71% 36 745 71.29% 183 
2003 1,060 185 386 36.42% 56 674 63.58% 129 
2004 1,081 252 462 42.74% 94 619 57.26% 158 
2005 1,053 223 467 44.35% 105 586 55.65% 118 
2006 1,025 263 464 45.27% 127 561 54.73% 136 
2007 994 225 459 46.18% 104 535 53.82% 121 
2008 986 178 450 45.64% 79 536 54.36% 99 
2009 978 118 429 43.87% 70 549 56.13% 48 
2010 981 200 418 42.61% 99 563 57.39% 101 
2011 994 210 397 39.94% 94 597 60.06% 116 
2012 1,017 224 384 37.76% 94 633 62.24% 130 
2013 1,049 198 368 35.08% 69 681 64.92% 129 
2014 - 235 - - 76 - - 159 
Total 13,302 2,730 5,201 39.10% 1,103 8,101 60.90% 1,627 
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Table II 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the universe of US rated publicly listed firms over the period 2001-2013. Specifically, it reports the number of observations (N), as well as 
mean and median values of the dependent and control variables for the full sample as well as for CDS and non-CDS firms. All dollar values are in millions and adjusted to 2001 dollars 
by the consumer price index (CPI). The third row contains the abnormal announcement return for those firms that make acquisitions over the period 2002-2014. Variable definitions 
are in the Appendix. Statistical tests for differences in means and equality of medians for each characteristic for CDS versus non-CDS firms are presented in parentheses. 
 
 Full Sample (1) CDS Firms (2) Non-CDS Firms (3) Difference (2) – (3) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean  
(p-value) 
Median 
 (p-value) 
Dependent Variables            
Acquisition Likelihood 13,302 0.164 0.000 5,201 0.173 - 8,101 0.158 - (0.020) - 
Acquisition Intensity 13,302 0.028 0.000 5,201 0.025 0.000 8,101 0.029 0.000 (0.053) (0.020) 
Acquirer CARs (-2, +2) 2,730 0.79% 0.52% 1,103 0.61% 0.33% 1,627 0.92% 0.78% (0.165) (0.009) 
Probability of Default 1,849 0.74% 0.00% 866 0.46% 0.00% 983 0.99% 0.00% (0.019) (0.000) 
Firm Control Variables            
Credit Rating Level 13,302 12.139 12.000 5,201 13.892 14.000 8,101 11.013 10.000 (0.000) (0.000) 
Size ($ million) 13,302 16,484 3,943 5,201 27,042 9,704 8,101 9,705 2,282 (0.000) (0.000) 
Excess Stock Return 12,333 0.097 0.027 5,040 0.070 0.018 7,293 0.115 0.036 (0.000) (0.009) 
Leverage 13,280 0.343 0.307 5,191 0.304 0.269 8,089 0.367 0.335 (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 13,267 0.136 0.130 5,178 0.142 0.136 8,089 0.132 0.125 (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Holdings 13,299 0.100 0.065 5,201 0.100 0.072 8,098 0.099 0.062 (0.738) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book 12,973 1.670 1.440 5,189 1.728 1.509 7,784 1.630 1.396 (0.000) (0.000) 
Interest Coverage 13,088 13.617 6.311 5,136 15.677 8.406 7,952 12.287 5.210 (0.000) (0.000) 
Speculative 13,302 0.550 - 5,201 0.295 - 8,101 0.713 - (0.000) - 
Altman-Z 12,201 2.813 2,529 4,849 3.020 2.741 7,352 2.676 2.368 (0.000) (0.000) 
StDevRet 12,315 0.418 0.359 5,037 0.368 0.319 7,278 0.453 0.391 (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 12,594 0.037 0.026 5,124 0.033 0.024 7,470 0.040 0.029 (0.000) (0.000) 
Convertible 13,220 0.023 0.000 5,166 0.017 0.000 8,054 0.027 0.000 (0.000) (0.418) 
Capex 12,763 0.062 0.040 5,010 0.058 0.040 7,753 0.065 0.040 (0.000) (0.533) 
PPE 13,289 0.333 0.269 5,197 0.326 0.268 8,092 0.336 0.269 (0.021) (0.878) 
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Table II (Continued) 
 Full Sample  (1) CDS Firms (2) Non-CDS Firms (3) Difference (2) – (3) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean  
(p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) 
Deal Control Variables            
Public 2,730 0.207 - 1,103 0.289 - 1,627 0.151 - (0.000) - 
Hostile 2,730 0.020 - 1,103 0.033 - 1,627 0.011 - (0.000) - 
Tender Offer 2,730 0.057 - 1,103 0.091 - 1,627 0.034 - (0.000) - 
Stock 2,730 0.032 - 1,103 0.030 - 1,627 0.034 - (0.573) - 
Cross Border 2,730 0.204 - 1,103 0.227 - 1,627 0.188 - (0.014) - 
Diversifying 2,730 0.498 - 1,103 0.521 - 1,627 0.482 - (0.047) - 
Relative Size 2,730 0.179 0.060 1,103 0.159 0.048 1,627 0.192 0.069 (0.010) (0.000) 
Industry Control Variables            
Herfindahl Index 13,302 0.178 0.132 5,201 0.189 0.138 8,101 0.171 0.128 (0.000) (0.008) 
M&A Liquidity 13,302 0.021 0.007 5,201 0.020 0.006 8,101 0.022 0.008 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
Table III 
Credit Default Swaps and Acquisition Investments 
 
 This table presents the effect of CDS on acquisitions announced over the period 2002-2014 for all US publicly 
listed firms with available credit ratings over the period 2001-2013. Column (1) presents marginal effects of a 
probit specification and column (2) unconditional marginal effects of a tobit specification. The dependent 
variable in the probit model takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one acquisition exceeding 1% of 
the market value of its equity in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the tobit model is the ratio of 
the sum of all acquisitions exceeding 1% of the market value of equity announced by a firm in year t, divided by 
total assets at the end of year t–1. The explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the 
dependent variable. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models include year and industry fixed effects, 
whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry 
classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and firm clustering.
 
***, ** and *
 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) 
   
CDS  0.051*** 0.010*** 
 (4.43) (4.18) 
Credit Rating Level 0.005* 0.001 
 (1.84) (1.46) 
Size -0.033*** -0.009*** 
 (-5.75) (-6.77) 
Excess Stock Return 0.014* 0.004* 
 (1.77) (1.93) 
Leverage -0.074** -0.015** 
 (-2.56) (-2.30) 
Profitability 0.203*** 0.053*** 
 (2.81) (3.19) 
Cash Holdings -0.073 -0.010 
 (-1.42) (-0.86) 
Market-to-Book -0.006 0.000 
 (-0.92) (0.19) 
Herfindahl Index -0.103 -0.026 
 (-1.27) (-1.56) 
M&A Liquidity 1.017*** 0.287*** 
 (9.96) (11.51) 
   
Industry F.E. Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
N 11,964 12,255 
Pseudo R
2 
0.090 0.140 
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Table IV 
Credit Default Swaps and Acquisition Investments: Tests for Endogeneity 
 
This table presents three different tests, which deal with endogeneity issues, for the effect of CDS on 
acquisitions announced over the period 2002-2014 for all US publicly listed firms with available credit ratings 
over the period 2001-2013. Panel A presents the results of a difference in difference analysis which restricts the 
effect of CDS on acquisitions for a sub-sample of firms that did not have CDS at t-2 and examines whether CDS 
initiation in the subsequent year (i.e., in t-1) meaningfully affects acquisition decisions in year t relative to non-
CDS firms at t-2 and t-1. Panel B presents the effect of CDS on acquisitions by implementing a propensity score 
matching (PSM) method, in which we calculate a one-dimensional propensity score, which is a function of firm- 
and deal-specific observable characteristics used in Table III, and we use a one-to-one (i.e., nearest neighbor) 
matching estimator. Panel C presents the estimates of the instrumental variables (IV) approach. In Panels A and 
B, column (1) reports marginal effects of probit specifications and column (2) presents unconditional marginal 
effects of tobit specifications. Accordingly, in Panel C, columns (2) and (3) represent the probit and tobit 
specifications, respectively (column (1) in Panel C represents the first-stage model of the IV approach). The 
dependent variable in the probit models takes the value of one if the firm announced at least one acquisition 
exceeding 1% of the market value of its equity in year t, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the tobit 
models is the ratio of the sum of all acquisitions exceeding 1% of the market value of equity announced by a 
firm in year t, divided by total assets at the end of year t–1. The explanatory variables are lagged by one year 
with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC 
code industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering.
 
***, ** and *
 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A.  Difference in Difference (DID) Approach 
 
 
 
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) 
   
CDS  0.081*** 0.018*** 
 (2.95) (3.32) 
Credit Rating Level 0.002 0.000 
 (0.52) (0.45) 
Size -0.031*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.50) (-4.36) 
Excess Stock Return 0.004 0.002 
 (0.41) (0.65) 
Leverage -0.083** -0.016* 
 (-2.14) (-1.81) 
Profitability 0.143 0.039* 
 (1.48) (1.72) 
Cash Holdings -0.115* -0.018 
 (-1.67) (-1.11) 
Market-to-Book -0.005 0.001 
 (-0.54) (0.28) 
Herfindahl Index -0.193 -0.042 
 (-1.32) (-1.34) 
M&A Liquidity 0.831*** 0.234*** 
 (5.32) (6.25) 
   
Industry F.E. Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
N 5,560 5,918 
Pseudo R
2 
0.099 0.165 
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Panel B. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) 
   
CDS  0.056*** 0.011*** 
 (4.66) (4.16) 
Credit Rating Level 0.002 0.000 
 (0.73) (0.40) 
Size -0.032*** -0.008*** 
 (-4.29) (-5.00) 
Excess Stock Return 0.039*** 0.009*** 
 (3.04) (3.29) 
Leverage -0.060 -0.011 
 (-1.51) (-1.27) 
Profitability 0.260** 0.065*** 
 (2.40) (2.78) 
Cash Holdings -0.093 -0.013 
 (-1.31) (-0.92) 
Market-to-Book -0.015 -0.002 
 (-1.44) (-0.91) 
Herfindahl Index -0.060 -0.020 
 (-0.49) (-0.81) 
M&A Liquidity 1.199*** 0.318*** 
 (8.36) (9.92) 
   
Industry F.E. Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
N 6,327 6,676 
Pseudo R
2 
0.107 0.183 
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Panel C. Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Stage Probit Second Stage Probit Second Stage Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Tier 1 Capital -0.043***   
 (-8.34)   
Foreign Operations 1.169***   
 (3.62)   
Derivatives Income 0.029***   
 (6.92)   
TRACE Coverage  0.154***   
 (13.80)   
Residual CDS   0.055*** 0.012*** 
  (4.86) (4.52) 
Predicted CDS   -0.198** -0.040** 
  (-2.45) (-2.21) 
Credit Rating Level 0.032*** 0.013*** 0.003*** 
 (6.38) (3.60) (3.13) 
Size 0.110*** -0.004 -0.003 
 (10.32) (-0.37) (-1.20) 
Excess Stock Return 0.007 0.018** 0.005** 
 (0.95) (2.20) (2.41) 
Leverage 0.226*** -0.022 -0.004 
 (3.90) (-0.65) (-0.55) 
Profitability -0.160 0.153** 0.044** 
 (-1.33) (2.07) (2.53) 
Cash Holdings 0.157* -0.044 -0.004 
 (1.72) (-0.83) (-0.35) 
Market-to-Book -0.011 -0.010 -0.000 
 (-0.86) (-1.34) (-0.24) 
Herfindahl Index 0.198* -0.038 -0.014 
 (1.69) (-0.44) (-0.76) 
M&A Liquidity -0.042 0.923*** 0.270*** 
 (-0.50) (8.90) (10.42) 
    
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes 
N 11,622 11,453 11,622 
Pseudo R
2 
0.283 0.089 0.132 
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Table V 
Credit Default Swaps and Acquirer CARs 
 
This table presents the estimates of the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the acquisition announcement on credit default swaps (CDS) and other 
acquirer- (column (1)) and deal-specific (column (2)) variables. The sample includes acquisitions announced 
over the period 2002-2014 for all US publicly listed firms with available credit ratings over the period 2001-
2013. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry classification 
dummies, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquiring 
firm clustering.
 
***, ** and *
 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
CDS  0.007** 0.006* 
 (1.98) (1.96) 
Credit Rating Level -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.05) (-0.09) 
Size -0.005*** -0.004** 
 (-2.91) (-2.17) 
Excess Stock Return -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.63) (-1.56) 
Leverage 0.011 0.008 
 (1.15) (0.85) 
Profitability -0.038 -0.039 
 (-1.44) (-1.48) 
Cash Holdings -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.03) (0.03) 
Market-to-Book -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.87) (-0.48) 
Public   -0.011** 
  (-2.34) 
Hostile  -0.013 
  (-1.37) 
Tender Offer  0.007 
  (1.32) 
Stock   -0.019** 
  (-2.56) 
Cross Border  0.001 
  (0.47) 
Diversifying   -0.002 
  (-0.72) 
Relative Size  0.015** 
  (2.49) 
Herfindahl Index  0.030 
  (1.03) 
M&A Liquidity  0.020 
  (0.66) 
   
Industry F.E.  Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
N 2,722 2,722 
Adjusted R
2 
0.045 0.055 
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Table VI 
Credit Default Swaps on Acquirer CARs and Change in the Probability of Default Conditioned on Credit 
Risk 
Panel A presents the estimates of the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the acquisition announcement on CDS and other acquirer- and deal-specific 
variables. Panel B presents the estimates of OLS regression analysis of acquirer change in the probability of 
default in the period surrounding the acquisition announcement. The dependent variable is the change in the 
probability of default based on Merton’s (1974) pricing model between year t+1 (post-treatment period) and 
year t-1 (control period) where year t is the year of the acquisition. The sample includes acquisitions announced 
over the period 2002-2014 for all US publicly listed firms with available credit ratings over the period 2001-
2013. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry classification 
dummies, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquiring 
firm clustering.
 
***, ** and *
 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. CARs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
CDS * Low Interest Coverage 0.023***   
 (3.49)   
CDS * Speculative  0.014**  
  (2.27)  
CDS * Low Altman-Z   0.013* 
   (1.78) 
CDS  0.002 0.000 0.003 
 (0.54) (0.09) (0.97) 
Low Interest Coverage -0.002   
 (-0.55)   
Speculative  -0.003  
  (-0.71)  
Low Altman-Z   -0.003 
   (-0.54) 
Credit Rating Level 0.000  0.000 
 (0.50)  (0.30) 
Size -0.004*** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (-2.67) (-2.53) (-2.49) 
Excess Stock Return -0.005 -0.005* -0.005 
 (-1.55) (-1.69) (-1.60) 
Leverage 0.003 0.005 0.007 
 (0.28) (0.58) (0.77) 
Profitability -0.031 -0.037 -0.040 
 (-1.12) (-1.46) (-1.48) 
Cash Holdings 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.16) 
Market-to-Book -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.67) (-0.48) (-0.50) 
Public  -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
 (-2.51) (-2.42) (-2.36) 
Hostile -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.32) 
Tender Offer 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 (1.58) (1.48) (1.41) 
Stock  -0.018** -0.019** -0.019** 
 (-2.34) (-2.51) (-2.50) 
Cross Border 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.34) (0.42) (0.41) 
Diversifying -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.68) (-0.71) (-0.73) 
Relative Size 0.014** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (2.40) (2.45) (2.44) 
Herfindahl Index 0.027 0.026 0.031 
 (0.94) (0.89) (1.05) 
M&A Liquidity 0.021 0.021 0.022 
 (0.72) (0.72) (0.73) 
    
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,722 2,722 2,722 
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.057 0.056 
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Panel B. Change in the Probability of Default 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
CDS * Low Interest Coverage -0.029*   
 (-1.83)   
CDS * Speculative  -0.007  
  (-0.96)  
CDS * Low Altman-Z   -0.023* 
   (-1.72) 
CDS  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.36) (-0.25) (-0.19) 
Low Interest Coverage 0.002   
 (0.20)   
Speculative  0.004  
  (0.82)  
Low Altman-Z   0.001 
   (0.07) 
ΔSize -0.027** -0.026** -0.026** 
 (-2.25) (-2.17) (-2.16) 
ΔExcess Stock Return 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (2.60) (2.63) (2.59) 
ΔLeverage 0.091** 0.092** 0.090** 
 (2.56) (2.50) (2.45) 
ΔProfitability 0.062* 0.056 0.063* 
 (1.66) (1.54) (1.75) 
ΔCash Holdings -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.23) 
ΔMarket-to-Book -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.91) (-1.00) (-0.88) 
ΔInterest Coverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.96) (1.14) (1.01) 
ΔStDevRet 0.213*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 
 (6.17) (6.21) (6.21) 
ΔVolatility -0.066 -0.052 -0.070 
 (-1.15) (-0.91) (-1.20) 
ΔConvertible -0.066** -0.063** -0.064** 
 (-2.41) (-2.20) (-2.23) 
ΔCapex -0.107* -0.105* -0.109* 
 (-1.75) (-1.71) (-1.74) 
ΔPPE 0.052 0.056 0.054 
 (1.44) (1.53) (1.50) 
    
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,357 1,357 1,357 
Pseudo R² 0.321 0.315 0.320 
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Table VII 
“No Restructuring” Clauses of Credit Default Swaps on Acquirer CARs and Change in Probability of 
Default Conditioned on Credit Risk 
Panel A presents the estimates of the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the acquisition announcement on the “no restructuring” clauses of CDS and 
other acquirer- and deal-specific variables. Panel B presents the estimates of OLS regression analysis of acquirer 
change in the probability of default in the period surrounding the acquisition announcement. The dependent 
variable is the change in the probability of default based on Merton’s (1974) pricing model between year t+1 
(post-treatment period) and year t-1 (control period) where year t is the year of the acquisition. The sample 
includes acquisitions announced over the period 2002-2014 for all US publicly listed firms with available credit 
ratings over the period 2001-2013. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code 
industry classification dummies, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquiring firm clustering.
 
***, ** and *
 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. CARs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
High “No Restructuring” CDS * Low Interest Coverage 0.015**   
 (2.15)   
High “No Restructuring” CDS * Speculative  0.010*  
  (1.67)  
High “No Restructuring” CDS * Low Altman-Z   0.006 
   (0.88) 
High “No Restructuring” CDS 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.19) (-0.27) (0.58) 
Low Interest Coverage 0.001   
 (0.17)   
Speculative  -0.002  
  (-0.38)  
Low Altman-Z   -0.000 
   (-0.06) 
Credit Rating Level 0.000  0.000 
 (0.42)  (0.32) 
Size -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* 
 (-1.94) (-2.03) (-1.85) 
Excess Stock Return -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.55) (-1.62) (-1.58) 
Leverage 0.005 0.007 0.009 
 (0.54) (0.80) (0.91) 
Profitability -0.032 -0.037 -0.040 
 (-1.16) (-1.46) (-1.49) 
Cash Holdings 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.13) 
Market-to-Book -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.61) (-0.50) (-0.46) 
Public  -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
 (-2.46) (-2.40) (-2.36) 
Hostile -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 
 (-1.34) (-1.35) (-1.27) 
Tender Offer 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (1.48) (1.42) (1.37) 
Stock  -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** 
 (-2.46) (-2.53) (-2.50) 
Cross Border 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) 
Diversifying -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.58) (-0.69) (-0.66) 
Relative Size 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (2.43) (2.47) (2.44) 
Herfindahl Index 0.028 0.028 0.032 
 (0.98) (0.96) (1.08) 
M&A Liquidity 0.019 0.020 0.019 
 (0.65) (0.66) (0.65) 
    
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,722 2,722 2,722 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.054 0.053 
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Panel B. Change in the Probability of Default 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
High “No Restructuring” CDS  * Low Interest Coverage -0.040**   
 (-2.51)   
High “No Restructuring” CDS  * Speculative  -0.015**  
  (-2.06)  
High “No Restructuring” CDS  * Low Altman-Z   -0.030** 
   (-2.38) 
High “No Restructuring” CDS 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.47) (1.20) (0.65) 
Low Interest Coverage 0.004   
 (0.46)   
Speculative  0.007  
  (1.63)  
Low Altman-Z   0.003 
   (0.30) 
ΔSize -0.026** -0.026** -0.025** 
 (-2.19) (-2.15) (-2.10) 
ΔExcess Stock Return 0.019** 0.020*** 0.019** 
 (2.58) (2.61) (2.55) 
ΔLeverage 0.093*** 0.092** 0.091** 
 (2.61) (2.53) (2.49) 
ΔProfitability 0.063* 0.056 0.063* 
 (1.68) (1.55) (1.76) 
ΔCash Holdings -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.32) (-0.22) (-0.25) 
ΔMarket-to-Book -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.89) (-1.03) (-0.88) 
ΔInterest Coverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.92) (1.26) (1.01) 
ΔStDevRet 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.217*** 
 (6.28) (6.24) (6.28) 
ΔVolatility -0.069 -0.054 -0.073 
 (-1.19) (-0.93) (-1.25) 
ΔConvertible -0.069** -0.061** -0.065** 
 (-2.48) (-2.15) (-2.25) 
ΔCapex -0.107* -0.106* -0.108* 
 (-1.76) (-1.73) (-1.74) 
ΔPPE 0.052 0.056 0.053 
 (1.43) (1.53) (1.49) 
    
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,357 1,357 1,357 
Pseudo R² 0.325 0.317 0.322 
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Table VIII 
Credit Default Swaps and Method of Payment 
 
This table presents the effect of CDS on the method of payment in acquisitions announced over the period 2002-
2014 for all US publicly listed firms with available credit ratings over the period 2001-2013. Columns (1) and 
(2) present marginal effects of probit specifications and column (3) estimates of an ordered probit specification. 
The dependent variable in column (1) takes the value of one if the firm announced at least one cash-financed 
acquisition exceeding 1% of the market value of its equity in year t, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable 
in column (2) takes the value of one if the firm announced at least one stock-financed acquisition exceeding 1% 
of the market value of its equity in year t, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column (3) takes the 
value of two for cash-financed deals, the value of one for stock-financed deals, and zero for no acquisitions. The 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are 
based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics 
reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering.
 
***, ** and *
 
denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Probit Probit Ordered Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
CDS  0.034*** 0.007* 0.225*** 
 (4.03) (1.69) (4.25) 
Credit Rating Level 0.005*** -0.001 0.029** 
 (2.65) (-1.57) (2.36) 
Size -0.017*** 0.001 -0.118*** 
 (-4.21) (0.41) (-4.39) 
Excess Stock Return 0.006 0.003 0.040 
 (0.89) (1.18) (0.99) 
Leverage -0.037* -0.001 -0.276** 
 (-1.83) (-0.07) (-2.05) 
Profitability 0.130*** -0.042** 0.802** 
 (2.58) (-2.03) (2.37) 
Cash Holdings 0.016 -0.024 0.018 
 (0.46) (-1.61) (0.08) 
Market-to-Book -0.004 0.006** -0.014 
 (-0.75) (2.56) (-0.42) 
Herfindahl Index -0.039 -0.042 -0.269 
 (-0.68) (-1.02) (-0.70) 
M&A Liquidity 0.367*** 0.128*** 3.409*** 
 (5.14) (3.00) (6.85) 
    
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,346 5,920 11,221 
Pseudo R
2 
0.085 0.101 0.110 
